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Abstract 
Guaranteed for and preserved by many law abiding institutions and documents, starting with national ones, 
mentioning the regional treaties and completing with the universal deeds, the ownership seems to be detached 
from its classic conceit and appears as a common concept, but nevertheless with a variable content, based on a 
series of constant elements such as juridical tradition of different member states, their economical and social 
upraise and even historical and political implications. Ownership must be perceived as a double sided coin, its 
right side up being a country’s normative system and the toss consisting of the international legal provisions that 
bring under regulation the most cherished material right of an individual. From time to time the coin lands on its 
brim, meaning that a conflict will be spawned between the two. It’s not to be neglected that the international 
protection of this fundamental right can be achieved by subjecting it to a number of courts that created the 
Community  acquis.  Which  of  them  had  the  most  important  contribution  in  establishing  a  guideline  shall 
transpire from the pages of this article.  
Key  words: ownership  deed,  human  rights,  international  courts,  injunctions  of  the  international  judicial 
institutions referred to by Romanian courts, encroachment of a private property right 
Introduction
In spite of the fact that they have been functioning for quite a while, both the European 
Human  Rights  Court  (Strasbourg)  and  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Communities 
(Luxemburg) can’t be perceived as anything more than dialogue mechanisms between the national 
courts.  In  order  to  invigorate  this  allegation,  we  should  turn  our  attention  at  least  to  the  sever 
injunctions of the romanian Constitutional Court that makes many refferals in its decisions to the 
rulings of  the European  Human Rights Court.  In  essence,  this  judicial institution  upbraided  the 
romanian state on the matter of inconsequence, incoherence and incapacity to frame a legal system 
that can be able to create a juridical security climate as well as for the numerous legislative gaps that 
can’t be strewed in another way than by an autonomous approach of every judge in a litigation.  
Out of the 47 signing states of the European Declaration of Human Rights, members of the 
European Council, Romania has the largest number of complaints registered when it comes down to 
laying the overall population over the number of offences claimed before the international institution, 
oscilating forwards and backwards between Rusia and Turkey. From 478 injunctions ruled by the 
European Human Rights Court, over half of them, 280 to be more precise, were given in relations to 
the encroachment of the ownership right, thus the interest that such a topic raises for a detailed 
analysis of the points made by the international courts when they enforced their decisions on the 
Romanian state.  
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A  professional  concern  was  put  forth  for  this  particular  issue  throughout  the  specialized 
literature, the subject being the main focus even for a phd. thesis. This fact underlines the timeliness 
of the item that makes the objective of the article that unfurls from here on.  
In the paragraphs below I will give my best efforts in trying to capture the main particularities 
of the ownership right’s borderlines in accordance with the conceit of the Strasbourg judges and he 
Luxemburg principal of proportions, in detecting the core of the private property concept and in 
shedding light on the institution of exerting use on assets in conformity with the general interest.  
Overview of ownership and its borderlines with the observance of the injunctions ruled 
by The International Court of Justice, The European Human Rights Court and The Court Of 
Justice of the European Communities  
The International Court of Justice had a diminished role in insuring the legal protection of 
ownership, mainly due to several circumstances like the fact that its organic writ (the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice
1) invests the Court with resolving the judicial litigations solely on the 
basis of the member states’
2 consent and that the only parties that can raise an issue are the states 
themselves
3. Qualified as the major juridical unit of the Organization, the International Court of 
Justice  had  insufficient  means  in  order  to  proceed  to  offering  an  effective  protection  for  the 
ownership right. Although the Statute is an almost universally signed treaty, so that at least in theory 
it had the ability to stress upon safeguarding the above mentioned right, it doesn’t regulate any 
particular right, but nevertheless it accomplished heeding the interest of the international community 
over the necessity of vouching for human rights as well as for imanent personal rights, without 
segregating on cultural, ethnical or religious criteria. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
which can’t be enforced on all of the member states, due to the fact that it hasn’t a mandatary power 
is all the same the first international deed that incorporates a catalogue of the cardinal human rights 
and liberties. Art. 17 stipulates the private property ownership, concluding that every individual may 
detain one or several estates, on his own or alongside others and that no one shall be divested in an 
arbitrary manner of his property. Subsequently, two more treaties came into being (The International 
Pact  for  Civil  and  Political  Rights;  The  International  Pact  for  Economical,  Cultural  and  Social 
Rights), but neither of them tied the ownership right to rules. All of these international documents 
were reunited under the generic denomination of The Human Rights Chart that may encompass the 
instrument referred to by the International Court of Justice when it tries a litigation. As I underlined 
anterior, the Chart is fairly irrelevant when it comes to conferring an international protection for the 
ownership right, this being the factor for which the regional systems that provide for the property 
right have an increased efficiency.  
Since the international scene can’t offer the solution for the moots that are brought before it, 
the interest for the matter grew on the European scale and on the Community level, the two proficient 
institutions in instrumenting the litigations concerning ownership being the European Human Rights 
Court and the Court of Justice of the European Communities. 
In conformity with art. 1 of the First Protocol to the European Convention for the observance 
of  human  rights  and  fundamental  liberties,  denominated  edgeways  the  Ownership  Protocol,  no 
private or juridical individual can be deprived of his property unless it is done for a public utility 
1 Art. 1 of the Statute stipulates that the International Court of Justice that was established by the United 
Nations Chart as the primary judicial unit of the Organization shall be encompassed and shall function in compliance 
with the provisions of this Statute.  
2 Art. 36 point 1 of the Statute postulates that the Court is competent to pass a judgment in the moots that the 
parties bring before it, as well as in all the others vexed questions that are listed by the United Nations Organization’s 
Chart or that are referred to in the treaties and conventions effective at that certain time. 
3 Art. 34 of the Statute affirms that only the states are entitled to be parties in the issues that are brought before 
the Court; Ch. Domincé, L’émergence de l’individu en droit international public, in L’ordre juridiqe international entre 
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cause  and  with  the  compliance  to  all  the  provisions  and  to  all  the  general  principals  of  the 
international law. These proclivities don’t inflict upon the right of the states to carry out any of the 
deeds that are considered to be necessary for regulating total utility of the assets in accordance with 
the general interest or in order to insure the excise tax payment, of other contributions or of fines. As 
I have already shown, art. 1, paragraph 1, second thesis of the Protocol stipulates the abridgement of 
property  for  public  utility  on  the  groundmap  of the legal  dispositions  and  the  principals  of  the 
international public law.  
The notion of deprivement of ownership rights is equivalent with that of dispossessing the 
entitled person of the asset itself and of all the attributes that bestowed on it and transferring the right 
to another’s patrimony (most of the times, the state’s). The capital manners through which the action 
is  enforced  are:  expropriation,  nationalization  and,  in  exceptional  cases,  requisition.  Although 
requisition is mainly a temporary limitation of one’s right to dispose at his own will of the good, 
sometimes it resembles expropriation, meaning that the transfer of the property right is definitive and 
is done with the payment of a retribution.  
Expropriation,  the  most  common  way  to  dispossess  someone  of  the  ownership  right,  is 
considered acceptable if it obeys a set of rules: the deprivement shall be enforced by internal juridical 
norms by each state on its own
4; the action against the title holder shall be justified by a public utility 
interest; the dispossessing shall be in conformity with the general principals on the international law. 
To these three legal postulates, the Court added another two jurisprudential ones: the divesting shall 
be  done  with the defray  of a counterbalance sum;  the  existence  of  an  equilibrium between the 
deprivation and the pursued aim of it.  
Nationalization  is  a  form  of  expropriation,  that  has  a  specific  trate,  that  in  its  classical 
configuration engages the lack of retribution, the existence of arbitrary or political
5 reasons for which 
the divesting is taking place and the fact that it’s endorsed maily upon enterprises and industrial 
branches. This issue and foremost the consequences of the nationalizations from the comunist period, 
as well as the annulment of the decisions to reinstaurate the former owners in their rights by granting 
the annulment appeals promoted by the Romanian General Prosecutor have been parameters for 
which Romania was convicted before The European Human Rights Court, on top of the list being 
inscribed  the  repercussive  cause  of  Brumarescu  vs.  Romania  (1999).  Therefore,  the  idea  of 
nationalization
6  is  not  in  itself  abhorrent  to  the  ownership  right  as  it  is  guaranteed  for  by  the 
Convention,  this  being  the  reason  for  which  the  Court  granted  permission  to  nationalize  the 
aeronautical and naval industry
7, but the arbitrary one tells against the private property. 
Another restraint entailed on the ownership right, or more precise on one of its prerogatives, 
is, in conformity with art. 1 paragraph 2 of the Convention, the use exertion of assets in accordance 
wih the general interest. In comparison with the deprivement of the ownership right, this manner of 
limitation reverberates solely on the use, meaning that the asset will not be transferred from one title 
holder to another, instead the exercise of the use will be restricted by the existence of a general 
4 Proffesor Corneliu Bîrsan, representative of Romania at the European Human Rights Court, considers that the 
concept of internal juridical norms should be perceived in extenso, meaning that it also includes decrees, injunctions or 
other law enforcing deeds, even the jurisprudence of some courts when this is thought to be a legal spawning grownd. 
He explains himself by underlining that different states conduct by different legal systems, so we shouldn’t misinterpret 
the will of the European Convention of Human Rights. Nevertheless, we appreciate that in the Romanian ownership 
right cocoon, the conceit of “law in the sense conferred by the Convention” shall be used in the perspective of art. 44 of 
the Romanian Constitution, corroborated with art. 73 letter m) and the Decision of the Court no. 6/1992, thus the 
restrictive interpretation of organic law.  
5  G.  Peiser,  Droit  administrativ.  Fonction  publique  de  l’Etat,  territoriale  et  hospitalière.  Domain  public. 
Expropriation, réquisitions. Travaux publics, 15
e édition , Dalloz, Paris, 1999, 136.  
6 On the problem of masked nationalizations B. Selejan-Gu an, Excep ia de neconstitu ionalitate, All Beck , 
Bucharest, 2005, 262-263. 
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interest which must be appeased and the observance of the ratio between the abridgement and the 
greatness of the general interest. The control of the usage may manifest itself through dictating some 
obligations or active conduct (the bondage to crop the land or to plant trees for the improvement of 
the ecosystem) or, on the contrary, through limiting the conduct of the owner or drawing directory 
lines (adopting rule catalogues for exerting some professions, establishing barrier prices for certain 
goods, setting roof type lease prices
8, prelonging the lease contracts over the term agreed to by the 
parties). The legal provision asserts that the states are entitled to adopt the necessary law abiding 
measures, but nevertheless they will be subjected to the ratio control test of the Court. It decided to 
appraise the equilibrium by ruling in a favorable way in the following situations: prohibiting the 
owner to use as residence  a construction building rigged up in a protected area
9; the obligation 
enforced  on  some  woodland  owners to  plant  trees of a  particular  essence  that  would favor the 
protection  of  the  ecosystem  and  the  production  of  timber
10;  forbidding  the  emplacement  of  a 
mechanical repair shop in a residential location
11; appealing to an urban plan in order to limit the 
building of other types of estates than the ones approved in the plan
12; instauring legal provisions that 
prohibit applying the succesoral sharing institution to an agricultural areal, in order to maintain its 
economical viability
13; classing an agricultural terrain as a natural site permanently under protection 
and exploiting it only by obtaining an authorization
14.
A special kind of usage control, even if sometimes it is the equivalent of the dispossession
15,
consists of  confiscating  the  asset  as a complementary  punishment for  committing a  crime.  The 
jurisprudence of the Court accounts that the confiscation measure is legitimate as long as the state 
obliges to the just equilibrium between its own interest and those of the owner and takes notice of the 
level of liability or the type of prudence needed in the circumstances that involve the case. For 
example, confiscation was ruled as legitimate when it referred to more immoral publications
16 or to a 
vehicle  used  to  commit  a  crime  for  the  purpose  of  impending  the  owner  to  continue  with  the 
misconduct
17.
The Court stated that they won’t be perceived as overriding of art. 1 of the First Protocol of 
the  European  Human  Rights  Declaration  the  following:  the  legal  provisions  for  declaring 
bankruptcy
18;  the  recognizance  of  minoritary  stake  holders  to  sell  their  social  parts  for  a  price 
established by independent arbitrators, but preserving the right to buy them back, in the very same 
conditions
19; the eviction of a person from a locative environment over which he didn’t posses any 
right
20; the adopting by the national authorities of a legislation that restrains the right of the owner to 
cancel the lease contract that is in the proceeding stage
21; adopting legal measures that roof the lease 
prices which had been anterior free settled
22; sentencing a contractual party to paying indemnities to 
the other
23.
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Despite the analysis that I carried out, on the 4
th of March 2008, the Court of European 
Human Rights ruled against Romania in a litigation based on the infringement of art. 1 of The 
Protocol. In the Burzo vs. Romania cause, the Court exceeded its attributions and substituted the 
national  legislative  organ  even  though  it  states  that  “although  the  Court  doesn’t  possess  the 
proficiency to substitute the national courts in an act of offering an interpretation of the internal 
juridical proclivities, it ascertains that the Appellate Court omitted to take into account one of the 
motives that the plaintiff claimed in the eviction matter that he brought before the court, on the 
fundament of which the inferior  courts had granted the action, in the same manner in which it 
overstepped other arguments of the plaintiff, thus making the conduct of the Appellate Court an 
encroachment  of  the  equitable  trial  principal”.  Furthermore,  the  European  Court  finds  that  “the 
restrictions that the owner-plaintiff had to endure in favor of the tenants (payment of a minimal lease 
price, the degradation of the asset) on a regular basis for several years are clearly disproportionate by 
comparison with the level of general interest that represented the motive for which he was deprived 
of the asset’s use”. In closing arguments, the Court referred to its constant jurisprudence in the matter 
of art. 1 of the Protocol, underlining the fact that O.U.G. 40/1999, whose provisions have been used 
by the Appellate Court to maintain the tenants in the locative area, represents a settlement of the use 
exercion that pursues a general interest. At the same time, the European Court marked the fact that 
while the prerogatives of art. 13 of O.U.G. 40/1999 weren’t fulfilled, the Appellate Court hasn’t 
made any mention of art 14 paragraph 2 of the same normative deed which stipulates that tenants 
who delay on a systematic basis the payment of the rent are not entitled to the renewal of the lease 
contract. The Court appreciated that the restrictions enforced upon the owner-plaintiff in favor of the 
tenants (the minimal retribution, the degrading state of the asset) weren’t affiliated to the observance 
of the just equilibrium between the protection of the plaintiff’s ownership right and the exigency of 
the  general  interest,  meaning  that,  in  this  particular  cause,  art.1  of  The  Protocol  suffered  an 
infringement.  
The guarantee and defense of the fundamental individual rights is also being encompassed by 
the European Court of Justice (the former Court of Justice of the European Communities). If we 
would trace a time schedule for the evolution of the ownership’s observance on the Community 
grounds, the best place to start is the analysis of one case that became the head stone in the matter of 
encroachment over the private property right. In the absence of a catalogue that would inscribe all he 
fundamental rights, the Court of Justice of the European Communities, with the aid of Hauer vs. 
Land Rheiland-Pfalz
24 case (1979), consacrated at that time a principal of general application that 
forced all of the others to respect the fundamental rights and liberties. The Court stated that “the 
ownership right is ensured for in the Community juridical order, in acceptance with the member 
states’  Constitutional  conceptions,  as  always,  reflected  by  the  first  additional  protocol  of  the 
European Human Rights Declaration…” In that particular case, the plaintiff was denied the release of 
an  authorization  for  planting  grapevine  on  a  square  surface  over  which  the  petitioner  had  an 
ownership right. The interdiction would have been for a 3 year long period, because of a Community 
regulation that stipulated that planting any crop would be contrary to hazard proclivities. The plaintiff 
made the allegation that his ownership right was struck by inefficiency and he was disallowed to 
practice his profession, in the manner that the fundamental German law should be interpreted. Ruling 
for the defendant, the Court declared that there was no infringement of the ownership right due to the 
fact that the provisions of the Regulation 1162/1976 weren’t inflictive, instead they were a type of 
restrictions  that  was  generally  spread  throughout  the  Community  member  states,  thus  trying  to 
implement a general interest. 
In the circumstances that even though the Community law is the beneficiary of spremacy in 
comparison with internal normative systems of the member states, at the same time that the first isn’t 
to clear in regulating rights and liberties or it does it at a lower standard than the national law, the 
24 T.  tefan, B. Andre an-Grigoriu, Drept comunitar, C. H. Beck , Bucharest, 2007, 154-158. 490  Challenges of the Knowledge Society. Law
cold shoulder of the German people and of the Italians raises the question of knowing which of the 
two  will  be  declared  as  having  priority.  The  answer  came  through  a  decision  of  the  Federal 
Constitutional Court of Germany that, although it was very controversed at the beginning, proved its 
efficiency on the long run, being followed by a number of other injunctions ruled on a unitary 
practice trend. The Solange 1 cause became the means of asserting that “the national proclivities 
regarding the fundamental rights must be perceived as reference points for the Community law, at the 
times when community organs can’t guarantee a protective cover for these rights at the same level as 
the national ones may do it”
25. The Maastricht Decision concluded that “the German constitutional 
court grants protection for the fundamental rights in cooperation with the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities”.  
A new high point on the stage of the  evolution of fundamental rights and liberties on a 
Community level was represented by the legitimize of art. 6 of the Treaty for establishment of the 
European Union, which conferred the Court of Justice of the European Union proficiency in this 
matter. However, since the Union is not a party to the European Declaration, the Court will apply this 
convention not as an enforceable deed, but more as a source of inspiration.  
The private property right has been regulated two more times, in 2004 in the text of the Treaty 
for the constituence of the European Union and again in 2007 in that of the Lisbon Treaty. In both 
cases,  the  treaties  came  with  attachments  of  the  rights’  catalogue  from  the  European  Union’s 
Fundamental Rights Chart, because the signing of the conventions would have meant the rights 
themselves would have acquired juridical  force. The rejection that the  two  treaties faced  at  the 
referendum that several member states organized put the objective on a waiting list. Therefore the 
ownership, aside from having an European dimension, it also has a Community aura, that has grown 
on its own, but not without establishing a conexion with the one that is mentioned by the First 
Protocol to the European Convention regarding the defence of the individual’s fundamental rights 
and liberties and not without being tinted by the jurisprudence of the European Human Rights Court.  
Conclusions  
There are two proficient juridical organisms on the European continent that can be addressed 
to with the plea to solve litigations regarding the enroachment of fundamental rights, this situation 
being the origin of the well assumed risk of obtaining different injunctions in similar cases. The 
formality of the coexistence was accomplished with the aid of the European Union’s Fundamental 
Rights Chart and of the European Social Chart, which have the role to create a catalogue of the 
preconsacrated  rights,  to  try to uniform  their interpretation in  front  of the  two courts and  most 
important of all, to make talk at art. 17 about the regulation and guarantee of the ownership right: 
“every person has the right to benefit from his legally acquired assets, to use and dispose of them, as 
well as leave them as heritage. No man can be deprived of his property, unless it’s for a public utility 
cause, in the strict conditions mentioned by the law and with the receivance in a just amount of time 
of a just retribution for his loss. The usage of the assets can be regulated through law as long as the 
respective action is in the general interest.” Article 17 makes transpire on one hand the partially 
borrowed expression from the European Declaration of Human Rights and on the other hand the 
numerous shades of the formulation that were entailed by the judicial practice of The European 
Human Rights Court, for example the express consacration of the retribution’s just character and the 
necessity for it to be paid in a fair amount of time.  
On the Community level, a strong German law influence made itself sensed by enforcing for 
the first time in 1979 the principal of proportions in the Hauer Cause stipulating that “in realizing the 
pursued objective, the restrictions mustn’t be perceived as disproportionate and intolerable inflictions 
25 G. Gornig, I. E. Rusu, Dreptul Uniunii Europene, second edition, C. H. Beck, Bucharest, 2007; I. E. Rusu, 
Problema leg turii dintre dreptul na ional  i dreptul comunitar în practica Cur ii Constitu ionale Federale din R. F. 
Germania cu privire la drepturile fundamentale, RRDC 1/2006, 55 and the next pages.  491
in the owner’s prerogatives that bring contiguity to the very essence of the ownership right”. In the 
twenty year younger Standley cause, the Court of Justice of the European Communities points out 
that “even the authorities of the member states are obliged, whenever they regulate limitations of the 
ownership right, to obey the principle of proportions. The owner shouldn’t be forced to bear any 
duties that overcome the absolute necessary for the pursued objectives to become reality”.  
The preoccupation manifested by the Strasbourg judges for defining the borderlines of the 
private property right, places its jurisprudence on a privileged staircase, thus any interpretation of 
The European Human Rights Declaration must be done by directing it to the judicial practice of the 
European Human Rights Court. A chronological glance over the decisions ruled by this institution 
will  shad  light  upon  the  pulsing  mechanism  of  the  Declaration,  trate  that  confers  it  a  great 
adaptability  to  the  economical,  social  and  political  reality  that  permanently  undergoes 
transformations and reinterpretations.  
The ownership right was the beneficiary of an elliptical regulation in the Treaty establishing 
the European Community which only underlined that the European Community will not prejudice 
the property regimes that are effectual in member states
26. In harsh conditions, the observance of the 
ownership right faced a brick path, its protection being realized in a praetorian manner and by being 
sustained by the common constitutional traditions of the member states
27. Although the Luxemburg 
judges were assigned only to watch over the abiding by the European constitutive treaties, they 
became real challengers for the ones in Strasbourg, in the matter concerning the protection of human 
rights.  
References  
Books 
P.M. Cosmovici, Drept civil. Drepturi reale. Obliga ii. Codul civil (Bucure ti: All Beck), 169-173 
C. Bîrsan, Conven ia European  a Drepturilor Omului. Comentariu pe articole (Bucure ti, All Beck, 2005) 
G. Gornig and I. E. Rusu, Dreptul Uniunii Europene (Bucharest: C. H. Beck, second edition, 2007) 
T. tefan and B. Andre an-Grigoriu, Drept comunitar (Bucharest: C. H. Beck , 2007), 154-158 
L.-M. Cr ciunean, Limitele dreptului de proprietate privat  imobiliar  (Bucure ti: Wolters Kluwer, 2009) 
B. Selejan-Gu an, Excep ia de neconstitu ionalitate (Bucharest: All Beck , 2005), 262-263 
Ch. Domincé, L’émergence de l’individu en droit international public in L’ordre juridiqe international entre 
tradition et innovation (Genève: Recueil d’études, PUF, 1997), 109
G. Peiser, Droit administrativ. Fonction publique  de l’Etat, territoriale et hospitalière. Domain public. 
Expropriation, réquisitions. Travaux publics (Paris : Dalloz , 15
e édition, 1999), 136
Journal articles 
C. Bîrsan, “Limit rile dreptului de proprietate reglementate de Conven ia European  a Drepturilor Omului”, 
Pandectele Române 3/2003, 165 and the next pages
E. Rusu, “Problema leg turii dintre dreptul na ional i dreptul comunitar în practica Cur ii Constitu ionale 
Federale din R. F. Germania cu privire la drepturile fundamentale”, RRDC 1/2006, 55 and the next pages 
Jurisprudence 
S. Pavageau, Le droit de propriété dans la jurisprudence suprêmes françaises, européennes et internationales
(LGDJ, Poitiers, 2006), 20-21 
Websites 
http://www.icj-cij.org/ 
http://jurisprudentacedo.com/ 
http://curia.europa.eu/
26 S, Pavageau, Le droit de propriété dans la jurisprudence supremes françaises, européennes et internationales, 
LGDJ, Poitiers, 2006, 20-21. 
27 Stauder Cause, Internationale Handelslsgesellschaft Cause, Rutili Cause.  